Equilibrium and efficiency in auctions of complementary goods without bundling

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(96)00842-7MaRDI QIDQ671696zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Hee-Su Kim

Publication date 27 February 1997

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(96)00842-7

zbMATH Keywords

AuctionComplementary goodsEfficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• An optimal auction for complements
• Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient
• Revenue equivalence in multi-object auctions
• Bundling decisions for selling multiple objects

Cites work

• Optimal Auction Design

Cited in

(2)

• Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions
• Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient

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