Evolutionary equilibria resistant to mutation

DOI10.1006/GAME.1994.1033MaRDI QIDQ1329901zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Richard T. Boylan

Publication date 9 August 1994

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4430.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicsNash equilibriumperfect equilibriaregular equilibriastationary point

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Problems related to evolution (92D15)

Recommendations

• Stability by mutation in evolutionary games
• On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria
• Evolutionarily stable sets
• Mutation rates and equilibrium selection under stochastic evolutionary dynamics
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games

Cited in

(12)

• Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
• Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
• Laws of large numbers for dynamical systems with randomly matched individuals
• Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations
• Stability by mutation in evolutionary games
• Selection for mutational robustness in finite populations
• On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria
• Evolutionary stability against multiple mutations
• EQUILIBRIUM, EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY AND GRADIENT DYNAMICS
• The stabilization of equilibria in evolutionary game dynamics through mutation: mutation limits in evolutionary games
• Evolutionarily rational mutations in structured populations
• Can evolutionary dynamics explain free riding in experiments?

This page was built for publication: Evolutionary equilibria resistant to mutation

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1329901)