Flexible representative democracy
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Cites work
- A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
- A threshold of ln n for approximating set cover
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- An approval-based model for single-step liquid democracy
- Approximating optimal social choice under metric preferences
- Awareness of voter passion greatly improves the distortion of metric social choice
- Beyond Condorcet: optimal aggregation rules using voting records
- Computerizing politics
- Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox
- Finding a collective set of items: from proportional multirepresentation to group recommendation
- Group fairness: from multiwinner voting to participatory budgeting (invited talk)
- Handbook of computational social choice
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1676659 (Why is no real title available?)
- Justified representation in approval-based committee voting
- Liquid democracy: an algorithmic perspective
- Multi-winner voting with approval preferences
- Opinion leaders, independence, and Condorcet's jury theorem
- Optimal Decision Rules in Uncertain Dichotomous Choice Situations
- Optimum committee size: quality-versus-quantity dilemma
- Ordinal Ranking with Intensity of Preference
- Pairwise preference learning and ranking.
- Proxy selection in transitive proxy voting
- Representative committees of peers
- Robustness of optimal majority rules over teams with changing size
- SATenstein: automatically building local search SAT solvers from components
- Simple preference intensity comparisons
- The convergence of iterative delegations in liquid democracy in a social network
- The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles
- The impartial, anonymous, and neutral culture model: a probability model for sampling public preference structures
- The Optimal Decision Rule for Fixed-Size Committees in Dichotomous Choice Situations: The General Result
- The Ostrogorski paradox
- The ostrogorski paradox and its relation to nontransitive choice
- Thirteen theorems in search of the truth
- Unveiling the truth in liquid democracy with misinformed voters
- Weighted representative democracy
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