Fomenting conflict

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2024.105875MaRDI QIDQ6604763zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Martin Szydlowski

Publication date 13 September 2024

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JET.2024.105875

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasionexogenous newspropagandashifting rhetoricwar of attrition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• To fight or not to fight? That is the question
• Strategic information transmission despite conflict
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• De-biasing strategic communication
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Cites work

• A conversational war of attrition
• Applied stochastic control of jump diffusions.
• Brownian models of performance and control
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1546853 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change*
• Nash equilibria of threshold type for two-player nonzero-sum games of stopping
• On the optimal stopping problem for one-dimensional diffusions.
• On the smoothness of value functions and the existence of optimal strategies in diffusion models
• Optimal dynamic information provision
• Pivotal persuasion
• Stochastic differential equations. An introduction with applications.
• The absence of attrition in a war of attrition under complete information
• The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear
• The war of information
• Two-point boundary value problems. Lower and upper solutions

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