Foundations of platform-assisted auctions
It is known that, the auction theory literature mainly focuses on designing auctions that incentivize the buyers to bid truthfully, assuming that the platform always faithfully implements the auction. In practice, however, the platforms have been found to manipulate the auctions to earn more profit, resulting in high-profile anti-trust lawsuits.\N\NIn this paper a new model for studying platform-assisted auctions in the permissionless setting, where anyone can register and participate in the auction is proposed. More precisely the authors show how cryptography can lend to the design of an efficient platform-assisted auction with dream properties. A new notion of simulation called utility-dominated emulation that is sufficient for guaranteeing the game-theoretic properties needed in an auction is proposed. Under this new notion of simulation, the authors show how to design efficient auction protocols with quasilinear efficiency, which gives an \(n\)-fold improvement over any generic approach where \(n\) is the number of buyers.\N\NFor the entire collection see [Zbl 08084026].
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Auctions with shill bidding
- Aurora: transparent succinct arguments for R1CS
- Candidate indistinguishability obfuscation and functional encryption for all circuits
- Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents
- Compact proofs of retrievability
- Constant-Round MPC with Fairness and Guarantee of Output Delivery
- Credible auctions: a trilemma
- Dishonest majority constant-round MPC with linear communication from DDH
- Homomorphic time-lock puzzles and applications
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- HyperPlonk: Plonk with linear-time prover and high-degree custom gates
- Indistinguishability obfuscation from well-founded assumptions
- Libra: succinct zero-knowledge proofs with optimal prover computation
- Marlin: preprocessing zkSNARKs with universal and updatable SRS
- Maximizing miner revenue in transaction fee mechanism design
- Multiparty computation with low communication, computation and interaction via threshold FHE
- On the communication complexity of secure function evaluation with long output
- On the security of time-lock puzzles and timed commitments
- On the size of pairing-based non-interactive arguments
- Optimal Auction Design
- Quadratic span programs and succinct NIZKs without PCPs
- Scalable zero knowledge with no trusted setup
- Secure multiparty computation goes live
- Security and composition of multiparty cryptographic protocols
- Short PCPs with Polylog Query Complexity
- Simple, fast, efficient, and tightly-secure non-malleable non-interactive timed commitments
- Spartan: efficient and general-purpose zkSNARKs without trusted setup
- Threshold cryptosystems from threshold fully homomorphic encryption
- Untangling the security of Kilian's protocol: upper and lower bounds
- What can cryptography do for decentralized mechanism design?
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