Identifying preferences for conditional cooperation using individual beliefs

DOI10.1080/03610926.2010.491588MaRDI QIDQ3100636zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Luis González, M. Vittoria Levati, Graciela González-Farías

Publication date 18 November 2011

Published in Communications in Statistics: Theory and Methods (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1080/03610926.2010.491588

zbMATH Keywords

conditional cooperationfinite mixturelatent class logitquantal response equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
• Behavior in a Dynamic Decision Problem: An Analysis of Experimental Evidence Using a Bayesian Type Classification Algorithm
• Belief elicitation in experiments: Is there a hedging problem?
• Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation
• Finite Mixture Distributions, Sequential Likelihood and the EM Algorithm
• Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
• Measuring Expectations
• Measuring Inequity Aversion in a Heterogeneous Population Using Experimental Decisions and Subjective Probabilities
• Quantal response equilibria for extensive form games
• Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
• Random usc functions, max-stable processes and continuous choice
• Social influence in the sequential dictator game

Cited in

(16)

• Conditional cooperation and framing effects
• Conditional cooperation and cultural worldviews
• Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games
• Use of data on planned contributions and stated beliefs in the measurement of social preferences
• Distributional preferences explain individual behavior across games and time
• The sophistication of conditional cooperators: evidence from public goods games
• Explaining cooperative behavior in public goods games: how preferences and beliefs affect contribution levels
• Conditional cooperation: type stability across games
• Preference for efficiency or confusion? A note on a boundedly rational equilibrium approach to individual contributions in a public good game
• Culture and public goods: the case of religion and the voluntary provision of environmental quality
• Collective action: experimental evidence
• Heterogeneous reactions to heterogeneity in returns from public goods
• Efficacy, beliefs, and investment in step-level public goods
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
• The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions
• Cooperation and social classes: evidence from Colombia

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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