Incentive-Based Pricing for Network Games with Complete and Incomplete Information

DOI10.1007/978-0-8176-4553-3_22MaRDI QIDQ5428669zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hongxia Shen, Tamer Başar

Publication date 23 November 2007

Published in Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-8176-4553-3_22

zbMATH Keywords

complete informationincentive controllabilityincentive policyincentivedesignincomplete informationnonlinear pricingproblemreverse Stackelberg gameteam solutionusage-dependent pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Cited in

(14)

• A Markovian mechanism of proportional resource allocation in the incentive model as a dynamic stochastic inverse Stackelberg game
• Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium, social welfare and optimal structure in hierarchical continuous public goods game
• Stackelberg equilibrium in a dynamic stimulation model with complete information
• Single-leader-multiple-follower games with boundedly rational agents
• Nonlinear and crossing influences incentive pricing control strategy for network systems with ideal state
• Incentives and pricing in communications networks
• Inverse Stackelberg public goods game with multiple hierarchies under global and local information structures
• Pricing in information orchestrators and maximizing stable networks
• Multi-incentive strategy in multi-service based networks
• Gradient-based local formulations of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism for truthful minimization of social convex objectives
• Nash and Stackelberg equilibria in games with pay-off functions constructed by minimum convolutions of antagonistic and private criteria
• Stackelberg and Nash Equilibria in Games with Linear-Quadratic Payoff Functions as Models of Public Goods
• Nash and Stackelberg equilibria in differential games with functionals in the form of the minimum antagonistic and partial criteria
• About one differential game with payment functions type of Germeier's convolution

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