Incentive analysis of collusion in fair division

DOI10.1007/978-3-032-18660-7_21MaRDI QIDQ7299280zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Haoqiang Huang, Biaoshuai Tao, Mingwei Yang, Sheng-Wei Zhou

Publication date 17 July 2026

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-18660-7_21

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Internet topics (68M11) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

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• Obvious manipulations
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• Simultaneously achieving ex-ante and ex-post fairness
• Strong Nash equilibria and mixed strategies
• The incentive guarantees behind Nash welfare in divisible resources allocation
• The price of anarchy of probabilistic serial in one-sided allocation problems
• Truth, justice, and cake cutting
• Truthful fair division without free disposal
• When is truthfully allocating chores no harder than goods?

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