Incentivizing hidden types in secretary problem

DOI10.1007/S00182-025-00922-WMaRDI QIDQ6992123zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Longjian Li, Alexis Akira Toda

Publication date 28 April 2025

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00182-025-00922-W

zbMATH Keywords

learningoptimal stoppingsecretary problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40) Games of timing (91A55)

Cites work

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• A sequential selection game with vetoes
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• Optimal stopping with sampling cost: The secretary problem
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• Secretary Problems via Linear Programming
• The best choice problem under ambiguity
• The Secretary Problem and Its Extensions: A Review
• THE SECRETARY PROBLEM IN A COMPETITIVE SITUATION
• The secretary recommendation problem
• Who solved the secretary problem

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