Information quality in sequential persuasion

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2025.112452MaRDI QIDQ6908570zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Wataru Kitano

Publication date 30 October 2025

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ECONLET.2025.112452

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian persuasionbelief-splittingcompetitive disclosuresequential persuasion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites work

• A geometric Blackwell's order
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Competition in persuasion
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• On Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders
• Sequential Bayesian persuasion
• Sequential persuasion

Cited in

(1)

• On the possibility of strategic ignorance in sequential persuasion

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