Genetical ESS-models. I. Concepts and basic model (Q1088605)

An evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), as introduced by Maynard Smith and Price in 1973 [see \textit{J. Maynard Smith}, Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge Univ. Press (1982)], may be imagined as a strategy that cannot be invaded by any mutant strategy from a given set of alternatives. Since 1973 this notion was used in phenotypic models to explain the evolution of animal interactive behaviour. The aim of this paper is to relate ESS-theory at the phenotypic level to the underlying genetical system. For the special case of a phenotypic ESS-model with two elementary strategies (phenotypes) based on a single diallelic locus in a diploid panmictic population, a corresponding genetical ESS-model is constructed and the connection of ESSs in both models is investigated.