Optimal deterrence of cooperation (Q1742146)

In the study of Gonzalez and Lardon, a new solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utility inspired by the core is introduced axiomatically. While core solution concepts have investigated the sustainability of cooperation among players, their solution concept, called contraction core, focuses on the deterrence of cooperation. The main interest of the contraction core is to provide a monetary measure of the robustness of cooperation in the grand coalition. The authors motivate this concept by providing optimal fine imposed by competition authorities for the dismantling of cartels in oligopolistic markets. They characterize the contraction core on the set of balanced cooperative games with transferable utility by four axioms: the two classic axioms of non-emptiness and individual rationality, a superadditivity principle and a weak version of a new axiom of consistency. In my opinion this paper is enjoyable to read and truly an enrichment in cooperative game theory. The paper's contents is widely innovative and pioneering. Many ideas are quite smart. Further, the authors give a quite good literature review. The paper is organized in an attentive way. Purpose of the paper is given perfectly. All theoretical results and implementations are explained evidently. Finally, the paper is very well motivated, structured, written; theory, methods and applications vary in an appropriate way. I fully recommend the paper for researchers and graduate students in the area.