Optimal deterrence of cooperation

DOI10.1007/S00182-017-0584-8MaRDI QIDQ1742146zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stéphane Gonzalez, Aymeric Lardon

Publication date 11 April 2018

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0584-8

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot oligopolyaxiomatizationTU-gamecontraction coreoptimal fine

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3677614 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592682 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1929535 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Core-equivalence for the Nash bargaining solution
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
• Multicoalitional solutions
• Oligopoly games with and without transferable technologies.
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• Preserving coalitional rationality for non-balanced games
• Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
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• The aggregate-monotonic core
• The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
• The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• The relative interior of the base polyhedron and the core

Cited in

(2)

• On the coalitional stability of monopoly power in differentiated Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies
• On the Allocation of Effort Among Deterrent Systems

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