Sociobiology and the structural stability of behavior patterns (Q1824579)

A structural stability approach to population-genetic systems and to dynamic evolutionary games is attempted in order to examine the theoretical significance of sociobiological selection models. A criterion of weak selection is derived that is not restricted to differential reproduction in polymorphic systems but describes possible directions of evolutionary change in time scales governed by genetic mutation rates. The criterion applies to the problems of how the initial mutational basis of an adaptive trait may be established and how this may happen, for analogous traits, independently in different species. Two basic sociobiological concepts are reconsidered with reference to the criterion. It is shown that W. D. Hamilton's condition of increases in inclusive fitness due to altruistic interactions among kin expresses the structural instability of populations against the evolution of altruistic behavior. Using the dynamic approach to evolutionary game theory, it is demonstrated that if a behavioral phenotype is an evolutionarily stable strategy, it is structurally stable against perturbations of the fitness payoffs, provided selection is weak. These results are applied to material problems of the evolution of animal social behavior.