Population-monotonicity and separability for economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object (Q5940598)

Two allocation models are studied. In the first model the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible commodity among agents with single-dipped preferences is considered. In the second model, a degenerate case of the first one, the allocation of an invisible object to a group of agents is studied. The rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and in addition either the consistency property separability or the solidarity property population-monotonity are considered. It is shown that the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and separability equals the class of rules that satisfy Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and nonbossiness. The characterizations of all rules satisfying Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and either separability or population-monotonity are provided. Since any such rule consists for the largest part of serial-dictatorship components, the characterizations are interpreted as impossibility results.