Rational choice and AGM belief revision (Q840824)

It is well known that there are close connections between the structures studied by economists in rational choice theory and those investigated by logicians in AGM belief revision theory. The paper under review takes a fresh look at these links by focussing on the notion of a partial AGM belief revision function. These are like the standard (alias full) ones, except that the domain of the input argument may be a proper subset of the set of formulae of classical propositional logic. The paper begins by noting that any choice frame (in the sense of rational choice theory) generates in a natural way a family of partial belief revision functions, one for each valuation function defining the states of the frame in which propositional formulae are counted as true. The central question raised is: under what conditions on the frame can every partial belief revison function in the associated family be extended to a standard one? An answer is established for the finite case: it is possible just when the choice structure is rationalizable in the usual sense of rational choice theory.