Justifiable preferences
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 232878 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3280855 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3195782 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Definition of Subjective Probability
- A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity
- A class of incomplete and ambiguity averse preferences
- Ambiguity Aversion, Robustness, and the Variational Representation of Preferences
- Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude
- Expected utility theory without the completeness axiom.
- Justifiable choice
- Knightian decision theory. I.
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Objective and subjective rationality in a multiple prior model
- Probabilistic dominance and status quo bias
- Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
- Rationalizing Choice Functions By Multiple Rationales
- Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
- Self-Confirming Equilibrium
- Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games
- Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom
Cited in
(23)- A class of incomplete and ambiguity averse preferences
- A unified view of the existence of maximals
- Indecisiveness, preference for flexibility, and a unique subjective state space
- Rational preferences under ambiguity
- A note on comparative ambiguity aversion and justifiability
- Inferring probability comparisons
- Modal preference structures
- A bi-preference interplay between transitivity and completeness: reformulating and extending Schmeidler's theorem
- Utility representation of an incomplete and nontransitive preference relation
- Incomplete preferences and confidence
- Rational preference and rationalizable choice
- Justifiable choice
- The interplay between transitivity and completeness: generalized \textsf{NaP}-preferences
- Variational Bewley preferences
- Extension of monotonic functions and representation of preferences
- Preferences with grades of indecisiveness
- Probabilistic dominance and status quo bias
- Necessary and possible preference structures
- Twofold multiprior preferences and failures of contingent reasoning
- Updating variational (Bewley) preferences
- Multiple priors and comparative ignorance
- Logics of imprecise comparative probability
- Incomplete preferences, willingness to pay, and willingness to accept
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