Large cores and exactness
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The authors answers that every exact game has a large core for 3 or 4-person games and the statement does not hold for games with 5 or more players. They also show that a large core, a stable core and exactness are equivalent for totally balanced symmetric games.
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Cites work
- Cooperative games with large cores
- Cores and large cores when population varies
- Cores of exact games. I
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4077005 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3683401 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1929535 (Why is no real title available?)
- Prosperty properties of TU-games
- Some Recent Developments inn-Person Game Theory
- Stability and largeness of core for symmetric games
Cited in
(34)- Convex multi-choice games: characterizations and monotonic allocation schemes
- On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
- Convex games with an infinite number of players and sequencing situations
- Convex interval games
- A note on the corelessness or antibalance of a game
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof
- Monotonicity and egalitarianism
- Preface: International conference on game theory and optimization, June 6--10, 2016, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, Chennai, India
- Algorithms for core stability, core largeness, exactness, and extendability of flow games
- On some families of cooperative fuzzy games
- Lexicographic allocations and extreme core payoffs: the case of assignment games
- Set-valued solution concepts using interval-type payoffs for interval games
- Core stability in chain-component additive games
- Stable cores of large games
- Concave integral with respect to imprecise probabilities
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4003951 (Why is no real title available?)
- New characterizations for largeness of the core
- STABILITY OF THE CORE IN A CLASS OF NTU GAMES: A CHARACTERIZATION
- A note: characterizations of convex games by means of population monotonic allocation schemes
- Sandwich games
- CONVEX GAMES VERSUS CLAN GAMES
- Extendability and von neuman-morgenstern stability of the core
- Stability and largeness of the core
- Minimal balanced collections and their application to core stability and other topics of game theory
- Characterization of TU games with stable cores by nested balancedness
- Convex and exact games with non-transferable utility
- Balancedness conditions for exact games
- Pricing rules and Arrow-Debreu ambiguous valuation
- Graph-restricted games and their inheritance of properties
- Population monotonicity and egalitarianism
- The boundary of the core of a balanced game: face games
- Symmetric solutions for symmetric games with large cores
- Stable allocations of risk
- Minimal large sets for cooperative games
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