Learning Manipulation Through Information Dissemination

DOI10.1287/OPRE.2021.2209MaRDI QIDQ5060519zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jussi Keppo, Michael Jong Kim, Xinyuan Zhang

Publication date 10 January 2023

Published in Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2209

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian dynamic programmingdeceptive advertisingdynamic learningexponential tiltinginformation designinformation disclosurerelative entropysocial learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic programming (90C39) Social learning (91D15)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• A theory of non-Bayesian social learning
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Cited in

(3)

• Selective revelation of public information and self-confirming equilibrium
• Formulating opinion dynamics from belief formation, diffusion and updating in social network group decision-making: towards developing a holistic framework
• A model of online misinformation

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