Learning and complementarities in speculative attacks
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- Speculative attacks with multiple targets
- Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity
- Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders
- Exchange rate manipulation and constructive ambiguity
- Giophantus distinguishing attack is a low dimensional learning with errors problem
- Learning under fear of floating
- Dynamic coordination with individual learning
- Talking heads. Public communication policies in an international economy
- Heterogeneous fragility, systematic panic and optimal transparency
- Information acquisition in global games of regime change
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