Less is more: optimal contest design with a shortlist

DOI10.1007/978-3-032-18660-7_9MaRDI QIDQ7299264zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Hanbing Liu, Ningyuan Li, Weian Li, Qi Qi, Chang-Yuan Yu

Publication date 17 July 2026

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-18660-7_9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Internet topics (68M11) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• Contest architecture
• Contests with rank-order spillovers
• Optimal crowdsourcing contests
• Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• Optimal orchestration of rewards and punishments in rank-order contests
• Optimal prize allocation in contests: the role of negative prizes
• Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests
• Sequential elimination in multi-stage all-pay auctions
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• The optimal multi-stage contest
• Your failure is my opportunity -- effects of elimination in contests

This page was built for publication: Less is more: optimal contest design with a shortlist

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q7299264)