Liberal Values and Independence

DOI10.2307/2296852MaRDI QIDQ4068407zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Julian H. Blau

Publication date 1975

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2296852

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Cited in

(23)

• A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation
• Individual powers and social consent: an axiomatic approach
• Rights and the liberal paradoxes
• Consistent rights on property spaces
• Collective Choice for Simple Preferences
• Pareto efficiency with spatial rights
• The Libertarian paradox: Some further observations
• Welfare inequalities and Rawlsian axiomatics
• The Libertarian resolution of the Paretian liberal paradox
• Envy-free rights assignments and self-oriented preferences
• Sen cycles and externalities
• The liberal paradox, decisiveness over issues, and domain restrictions
• Diversity and rights: a social choice-theoretic analysis of the possibility of public reason
• Rational performance and Gibbard's Pareto-consistent libertarian claim
• On the impossibility of a generalization of the libertarian resolution of the liberal paradox
• Invoking a Cartesian product structure on social states. New resolutions of Sen's and Gibbard's impossibility theorems
• Alternative libertarian claims and Sen's paradox
• Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
• Sen's theorem: geometric proof, new interpretations
• The effect of unconditional preferences on Sen's paradox
• Restricted Pareto and rights
• Ordinal utility differences
• Equity, efficiency and rights in social choice

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