Manipulating picking sequences
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Recommendations
Cited in
(15)- Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods
- Equilibria in sequential allocation
- Picking sequences and monotonicity in weighted fair division
- Allocating indivisible goods to strategic agents: pure Nash equilibria and fairness
- Efficient reallocation under additive and responsive preferences
- On fairness via picking sequences in allocation of indivisible goods
- Parameterized complexity of manipulating sequential allocation
- Approximate and strategyproof maximin share allocation of chores with ordinal preferences
- Fair division of indivisible goods: recent progress and open questions
- Manipulating waiting-plus-detour-time mechanisms for pickup and delivery problems
- Complexity of round-robin allocation with potentially noisy queries
- Formal verification and synthesis of mechanisms for social choice
- Complexity of round-robin allocation with potentially noisy queries
- Fair and almost truthful mechanisms for additive valuations and beyond
- Axiomatic characterizations of draft rules
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