Marital stability with committed couples: a revealed preference analysis
From MaRDI portal
Cites work
- Afriat and Revealed Preference Theory
- Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
- Convex Analysis
- Efficiency, stability, and commitment in senior level job matching markets
- Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests
- Estimating consumption economies of scale, adult equivalence scales, and household bargaining power
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1234104 (Why is no real title available?)
- Marriage, labor supply, and home production
- On the revealed preference analysis of stable aggregate matchings
- Rational Household Labor Supply
- Revealed Preference Tests of Collectively Rational Consumption Behavior: Formulations and Algorithms
- Sharing rule identification for general collective consumption models
- The assignment game. I: The core
- The Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identification, Estimation, and Testing
- The Construction of Utility Functions from Expenditure Data
- The core of the matching game
- The elasticity of substitution between time and market goods: evidence from the great recession
- The Microeconomics of Efficient Group Behavior: Identification
- The morphology of price dispersion
- The Nonparametric Approach to Demand Analysis
- The revealed preference theory of stable and extremal stable matchings
- Transferable utility and demand functions
- What matchings can be stable? The testable implications of matching theory
This page was built for publication: Marital stability with committed couples: a revealed preference analysis
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q7009292)
