Multi-unit supply-monotone auctions with Bayesian valuations

DOI10.1137/1.9781611975482.12MaRDI QIDQ5236193zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuan Deng, Debmalya Panigrahi

Publication date 15 October 2019

Published in Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611975482.12

zbMATH Keywords

Bayesian settingbudget-constrained biddersmulti-unit auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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(9)

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• Prior-free multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders
• Bayesian Inference in Structural Second-Price Common Value Auctions
• Multi-unit Bayesian auction with demand or budget constraints
• Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers
• Clinching auctions with online supply
• Online random sampling for budgeted settings
• Online random sampling for budgeted settings
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits

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