Online random sampling for budgeted settings

DOI10.1007/S00224-019-09918-YMaRDI QIDQ5919606zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alon Eden, Michal Feldman, Adi Vardi

Publication date 5 September 2019

Published in Theory of Computing Systems (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00224-019-09918-y

zbMATH Keywords

budgetsliquid welfaremechanism designonline mechanismonline multi-unit auctionsrevenue maximization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A multiple-choice secretary algorithm with applications to online auctions
• A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
• Clinching auctions with online supply
• Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions
• Competitive auctions
• Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2119761 (Why is no real title available?)
• Liquid price of anarchy
• Liquid welfare maximization in auctions with multiple items
• Matroids, secretary problems, and online mechanisms
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• Near-optimal online auctions
• Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
• Online mechanisms
• Reducing truth-telling online mechanisms to online optimization
• Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets
• The Efficiency of Resource Allocation Mechanisms for Budget-Constrained Users
• The power of randomness in Bayesian optimal mechanism design

Cited in

(4)

• Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
• Online random sampling for budgeted settings
• Maximize liquid welfare in combinatorial auctions with monotone valuations
• Liquid welfare maximization in auctions with multiple items

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