Budget-constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
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Cited in
(21)- On revenue-maximizing mechanisms assuming convex costs
- A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer
- Selling mechanisms for a financially constrained buyer
- Truthful unit-demand auctions with budgets revisited
- Bayesian auctions with efficient queries
- Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders
- Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items
- Multi-parameter mechanism design under budget and matroid constraints
- Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness
- First‐price auctions with budget constraints
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1833405 (Why is no real title available?)
- Multi-unit Auctions with Budgets and Non-uniform Valuations
- An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders
- Multi-unit Bayesian auction with demand or budget constraints
- Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
- Incentive-compatible learning of reserve prices for repeated auctions
- Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets
- Algorithm Theory - SWAT 2004
- Multi-Item Nontruthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue
- Online random sampling for budgeted settings
- Online random sampling for budgeted settings
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