Position Auctions with Budgets: Existence and Uniqueness

DOI10.2202/1935-1704.1648MaRDI QIDQ3161816zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz

Publication date 18 October 2010

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/64459

zbMATH Keywords

budget constraintsenvy-free allocationsex-post implementationPareto-efficiencyposition auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Simultaneous auctions with budgets: equilibrium existence and characterization
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• Optimal auctions with endogenous budgets
• Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders

Cites work

• Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders

Cited in

(16)

• Truthfulness in advertising? Approximation mechanisms for knapsack bidders
• A note on the efficiency of position mechanisms with budget constraints
• Position auctions with multi-unit demands
• Towards characterizing the deterministic combinatorial constrained efficient space
• Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities
• The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings
• Uniqueness in symmetric first-price auctions with affiliation
• Competitive equilibria in two-sided matching markets with general utility functions
• Dictatorial mechanisms in constrained combinatorial auctions
• A note on the incompatibility of strategy-proofness and Pareto-optimality in quasi-linear settings with public budgets
• Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets
• Expressiveness and robustness of first-price position auctions
• An efficient and incentive-compatible dynamic multi-item auction under budget constraints
• Position auctions for sponsored search in marketplaces
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints

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