Revenue maximization when bidders have budgets

DOI10.1145/1109557.1109676MaRDI QIDQ3583424zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Zoë Abrams

Publication date 16 August 2010

Published in Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithm - SODA '06 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1145/1109557.1109676

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cited in

(10)

• On envy-free revenue approximation for combinatorial buyers with budgets
• A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer
• Unconditional competitive auctions with copy and budget constraints
• Competitive auctions
• Online random sampling for budgeted settings
• Walrasian pricing in multi-unit auctions
• The balloon popping problem revisited: lower and upper bounds
• Mechanism design for auctions with externalities on budgets
• Multi-unit auctions with budget limits
• A near Pareto optimal auction with budget constraints

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