Multiobjective linear production programming games

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The authors consider a manufacturing situation in which several players can team together. Each player \(i\) has an amount \(b^i_r\) of \(r\)-th resource, so when a coalition \(S\) is formed, it has \(b_r(S)=\sum_{i\in S} b^i_r\) of \(r\)-th resource. Using these resources, \(S\) can produce goods \((z_1,\ldots,z_l)\) if \(z_j=\sum c_{jk}x_k\) for some values \(x_k\geq 0\) for which \(\sum a_{rk}x_k\leq b_r(S)\) for all resources \(r\). If we want to maximize the production, we only consider, for every coalition \(S\), the set \(V(S)\subset R^l\) of all Pareto-optimal possible vectors \(z=(z_1,\ldots,z_l)\). For each output from \(V(S)\), the members of the coalition divide the resulting \(l\) products between themselves. An imputation vector corresponding to all the players acting together is called dominated if some players, by forming a coalition, can achieve more for themselves. A core is naturally defined as the set of all non-dominated imputations. The authors show that the core is always non-empty, and show how to compute the core of a given game. For the entire collection see [Zbl 0940.00066].











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