On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control

DOI10.2307/2296917MaRDI QIDQ3910269zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Partha Dasgupta, Peter J. Hammond, Eric Maskin

Publication date 1980

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/64e5400f251ac58823907d0cd19e4328167497e3

zbMATH Keywords

emission taxesimperfect informationoptimal pollution controltax policies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cited in

(15)

• Mechanism design when players' preferences and information coincide
• Network pollution games
• A complete implementation of the efficient allocation of pollution
• On optimal extraction under asymmetric information over reclamation costs
• Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
• Truthful implementation and preference aggregation in restricted domains
• On optimal environmental taxation and envorcement: Information, monitoring and efficiency
• AN ITERATIVE PROCEDURE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION CONTROL UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
• Environmental regulation in project-based industries
• Pollution control by options trading
• Environmental policy à la carte: letting firms choose their regulation
• Oligopolistic incentives for pollution control with nonzero conjectures
• An optional permit system for global pollution control
• Managing partially protected resources under uncertainty
• On reducing the windfall profits in environmental subsidy programs

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