On the constancy of bribe-proof solutions

DOI10.1007/S00199-002-0267-XMaRDI QIDQ1407778zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hideki Mizukami

Publication date 21 September 2003

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10110/1671

zbMATH Keywords

Bribe-proofnessConstancySocial choiceStrategy-proofnessTransferable utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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• Manipulation through bribes
• Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results
• Bribe-proof rules in the division problem
• Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement
• Bribeproof Mechanisms for Two-Values Domains
• Often Harder than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Bribery in CP-nets
• Collusive dominant-strategy truthfulness

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