On uniqueness of coalitional equilibria

MaRDI QIDQ2827125zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Michael Finus, Pierre von Mouche, Bianca Rundshagen

Publication date 12 October 2016

Full work available at URL http://mathnet.ru/eng/cgtm219

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationCournot oligopolyequilibrium (semi-)uniquenessgame in strategic formpublic good

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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Cited in

(7)

• Equilibrium uniqueness in aggregative games: very practical conditions
• The two-stage game approach to coalition formation: where we stand and ways to go
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• Coalitional ZP-Equilibrium in Games and its Existence
• PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATION
• On the geometric structure of the Cournot equilibrium set: the case of concave industry revenue and convex costs
• Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games

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