Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction

DOI10.2307/2296952MaRDI QIDQ3674369zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Oliver D. Hart

Publication date 1983

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2296952

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationimplicit contract theorylabour marketnon-Walrasian unemploymentrisk aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Cited in

(10)

• Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?
• Optimal allocation of MRI scan capacity among competing hospital departments
• Principal-agent maintenance problem
• Under- and overemployment in optimal layoff contracts
• Income fluctuation and asymmetric information: An example of a repeated principal-agent problem
• Optimal contracts for agents with adverse selection
• A characterization of employment distortions in labor contracts with asymmetric information
• Insiders and outsiders and efficient asymmetric information contracts
• Asymptotic efficiency in principal-agent models with hidden information
• Dynamic labor contracts under asymmetric information

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