Optimal commitment policy under noisy information

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2004.07.009MaRDI QIDQ956491zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kosuke Aoki

Publication date 25 November 2008

Published in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2004.07.009

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentnoisy informationoptimal monetary policy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• LEARNING, COMMITMENT, AND MONETARY POLICY
• Optimal monetary policy under uncertainty.
• Optimal policy with limited commitment
• Inflation targeting with imperfect information
• Static and dynamic effects of central bank transparency

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 192992 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2076226 (Why is no real title available?)
• Indicator variables for optimal policy under asymmetric information

Cited in

(7)

• Reflections on the failure of the Taylor principle under commitment
• The value of monetary policy commitment under imperfect fiscal credibility
• Inflation targeting with imperfect information
• Imperfect transparency and shifts in the central bank's output gap target
• Indicator variables for optimal policy under asymmetric information
• Rules versus discretion in Central Bank communication
• The optimal degree of monetary discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information

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