Optimal entry deterrence under uncertainty

DOI10.1007/S10100-025-00966-ZMaRDI QIDQ6985444zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Richard F. Hartl, Peter M. Kort, Stefan Wrzaczek

Publication date 13 May 2025

Published in CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S10100-025-00966-Z

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationentry deterrenceincumbent-entrant

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Cites work

• Capital accumulation, asset values and imperfect product market competition
• Entry deterrence by timing rather than overinvestment in a strategic real options framework
• Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
• Lumpy capacity investment and disinvestment dynamics
• Optimal firm growth under the threat of entry
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Strategic corporate social responsibility, imperfect competition, and market concentration
• Uncertainty and entry deterrence

Cited in

(1)

• George Leitmann's 100th birthday

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