Peace agreements without commitment
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(19)- Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security
- A dynamic theory of war and peace
- Prudence versus predation and the gains from trade
- Inequality and conflict: burning resources to support peace
- A game-free microfoundation of mutual optimism
- Inequality and conflict outbreak
- Contests with small noise and the robustness of the all-pay auction
- Self-enforcing peace agreements that preserve the status quo
- Endogenous timing in general rent-seeking and conflict models
- War signals: a theory of trade, trust, and conflict
- A dynamic theory of resource wars
- Plunder and tribute in a Malthusian world
- Appeasement or radicalism: a game between intruders and occupiers
- Conflict and deterrence under strategic risk
- The interaction of emotions and cost-shifting rules in civil litigation
- Preventive wars
- Propaganda and conflict
- All-pay war
- When does the private provision of a public good prevent conflict?
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