Conflict and distribution

DOI10.1006/JETH.1999.2549MaRDI QIDQ1806206zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Debraj Ray, Joan Maria Esteban

Publication date 20 December 1999

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2549

zbMATH Keywords

conflict equilibriumgroups' preferencesmodel of conflict

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Recommendations

• The evolution of preferences for conflict
• Inequality and conflict outbreak
• Dynamical systems of conflict in terms of structural measures
• Explicitly solvable models of redistribution of the conflict space
• Conflict individual-Pareto equilibria

Cites work

• Conflict and distribution
• Contest success functions
• Empirics for growth and distribution: Stratification, polarization, and convergence clubs
• On the Measurement of Polarization
• Power, growth, and the voracity effect
• Social conflict and growth.

Cited in

(49)

• Polarization in networks: identification-alienation framework
• Extremism drives out moderation
• Effective property rights, conflict and growth
• Dynamical systems of conflict in terms of structural measures
• Ethnic distribution, effective power and conflict
• Measuring ethnic polarization
• Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information
• Dynamic inconsistency and self-control: a planner--doer interpretation.
• Replicating contests
• Can extremism reduce conflict?
• Conflict and Development
• The stability threshold and two facets of polarization
• Peace agreements without commitment
• Inequality and conflict outbreak
• Free riding and ethnic heterogeneity
• Common-value group contests with asymmetric information
• When does the private provision of a public good prevent conflict?
• On attitude polarization under Bayesian learning with non-additive beliefs
• On equilibrium uniqueness in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests
• A theory of elite-biased democracies
• Asymmetric conflict games with an extremist
• Uneven Development and Bilateral Conflict
• Problem of optimal strategy in the models of conflict redistribution of the resource space
• A theory of agreements in the shadow of conflict: The genesis of bargaining power
• On the Origins of Property Rights: Conflict and Productionin the State of Nature
• On the social efficiency of conflict
• Social conflict and wage inequality
• On equilibrium existence in generalized multi-prize nested lottery contests
• Coalition formation in the presence of continuing conflict
• Dynamics of two-group conflicts: a statistical physics model
• Conflict and distribution
• Effort maximization in asymmetric contest games with heterogeneous contestants
• Stakeholders in bilateral conflict
• Bi-polarization comparisons
• Lobbying as a multidimensional tug of war
• Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests
• The Dynamics of Instability
• Explicitly solvable models of redistribution of the conflict space
• Comparing bargaining solutions in the shadow of conflict: how norms against threats can have real effects
• Positive and negative campaigning in primary and general elections
• Conflicts in regular networks
• The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities
• A model of the origins of basic property rights
• Conflict without an apparent cause
• A dynamic theory of war and peace
• A new approach to the measurement of polarization for grouped data
• Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
• Contests with multiple alternative prizes: public-good/bad prizes and externalities
• Polarization and conflict among groups with heterogeneous members

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