Principals and agents: does the assignment of information matter?

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(90)90005-LMaRDI QIDQ1676740zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Julianne Nelson

Publication date 9 November 2017

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90005-l

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Recommendations

• Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• On Competitive Equilibria with Asymmetric Information
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents

Cites work

• Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information

Cited in

(2)

• Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent
• Informed agent's advice in bargaining under two-sided incomplete information

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