Procurement with competing insiders

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2025.112289MaRDI QIDQ6957301zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Matthew J. Robertson

Publication date 16 July 2025

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ECONLET.2025.112289

zbMATH Keywords

expected revenueoverbiddingprocurementstrong insiderstournament auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• An optimal auction with correlated values and risk aversion
• Auction design with a risk averse seller
• Auction market theory of heterogeneous bidders
• Auction theory. Introductory exercises with answer keys
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
• Optimal Auction Design
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Procurement with a strong insider
• Procurements with Bidder Asymmetry in Cost and Risk-Aversion
• Risk aversion and asymmetry in procurement auctions: identification, estimation and application to construction procurements
• Sequential elimination in multi-stage all-pay auctions

Cited in

(1)

• A tractable theory of value-dependent spite in first- and second-price auctions

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