Procurement with a strong insider

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111785MaRDI QIDQ6594833zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Luca Anderlini, GaOn Kim

Publication date 29 August 2024

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111785

zbMATH Keywords

increased revenueoverbiddingstrong insidertournament auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders
• Interdependent value auctions with insider information: theory and experiment
• Risky procurement with an insider bidder
• Can the seller benefit from an insider in common-value auctions?
• Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction

Cites work

• Asymmetric Auctions
• Optimal Auction Design

Cited in

(2)

• A tractable theory of value-dependent spite in first- and second-price auctions
• Procurement with competing insiders

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