Modeling large electorates with Fourier series, with applications to Nash equilibria in proximity and directional models of spatial competition

DOI10.1007/S003550050086MaRDI QIDQ1374820zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Samuel III Merrill, Bernard Grofman

Publication date 11 December 1997

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050086

zbMATH Keywords

existence of Nash equilibrialarge electoratestwo-dimensional spatial majority rule voting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Spatial models in sociology (91D25) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Voting theory (91B12)

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