Modeling large electorates with Fourier series, with applications to Nash equilibria in proximity and directional models of spatial competition

DOI10.1007/S003550050086zbMATH Open0888.90036OpenAlexW1965859584MaRDI QIDQ1374820FDOQ1374820

Authors: Samuel III Merrill, Bernard Grofman 

Publication date: 11 December 1997

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050086

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zbMATH Keywords

existence of Nash equilibrialarge electoratestwo-dimensional spatial majority rule voting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Spatial models in sociology (91D25) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Voting theory (91B12)

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• Toward a \(50\%\)-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed

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