Two approaches to the problem of sharing delay costs in joint projects
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(18)- How to distribute costs associated with a delayed project
- How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects
- A value for \(PERT\) problems
- Project management games
- A survey of variants and extensions of the resource-constrained project scheduling problem
- A polynomial rule for the problem of sharing delay costs in PERT networks
- Revenue sharing for resource reallocation among project activity contractors
- Allocating slacks in stochastic PERT network
- Nash equilibria for the multi-agent project scheduling problem with controllable processing times
- Nash equilibrium solutions in multi-agent project scheduling with milestones
- Sharing delay costs in stochastic scheduling problems with delays
- Cost sharing in production economies
- A project game for PERT networks
- Hart and Mas-Colell consistency in PERT problems
- A game theoretical approach to sharing penalties and rewards in projects
- Project games
- A new Shapley value-based rule for distributing delay costs in stochastic projects
- Multi-mode resource-constrained project scheduling problem with material ordering under bonus-penalty policies
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