Exclusive contracts and bargaining power

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.11.021MaRDI QIDQ1672779zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hiroshi Kitamura, Noriaki Matsushima, Misato Sato

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/11094/57764

zbMATH Keywords

antitrust policyentry deterrenceexclusive contractsNash bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Exclusive contracts when the incumbent can establish a direct retailer
• Paying not to sell
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Cites work

• The Nash bargaining solution in vertical relations with linear input prices

Cited in

(11)

• Staggered contracts and profitable entry deterrence: An application to professional sports
• Exclusive dealing and vertical integration in interlocking relationships
• Procurement of advanced inputs and welfare-reducing vertical integration
• Negotiation-sequence, pricing, and ordering decisions in a three-echelon supply chain: a coopetitive-game analysis
• Paying not to sell
• Sustainable and optimal ``uniqueness contract in public-private partnership projects of transportation infrastructure
• Exclusive contracts when the incumbent can establish a direct retailer
• Exclusive dealing as a barrier to entry? Evidence from automobiles
• Contract design and bargaining power
• Bargaining over a license: A counterintuitive result
• Partial cross ownership, exclusive contracting, and market entry

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