Procurement of advanced inputs and welfare-reducing vertical integration
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Publication:2134170
DOI10.1007/S00712-021-00759-3zbMATH Open1490.91109OpenAlexW3201114936MaRDI QIDQ2134170FDOQ2134170
Authors: Chul-Hi Park, Toshihiro Matsumura, Sang-Ho Lee
Publication date: 6 May 2022
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-021-00759-3
Recommendations
- Integrated optimization of procurement, processing, and trade of commodities
- Optimal Procurement Mechanisms
- Cost-Reducing Investment, Optimal Procurement and Implementation by Auctions
- Heterogeneity-promoting optimal procurement.
- On the welfare effects of vertical integration: opportunism vs. double marginalization
- Efficiency versus optimality in procurement
- Welfare reducing vertical licensing in the presence of complementary inputs
- Supply chain contracting with product substitution and partial vertical integration
- How increasing supplier search cost can increase welfare
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
Cited In (6)
- On the welfare effects of vertical integration: opportunism vs. double marginalization
- Welfare reducing vertical licensing in the presence of complementary inputs
- Informal input suppliers, quality choice and welfare
- Vertical integration without intrafirm trade
- Vertical mergers with input substitution: double marginalization, foreclosure and welfare
- Backward Integrated Information Gatekeepers and Independent Divisions in the Product Market
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