Three-party stochastic evolutionary game analysis of reward and punishment mechanism for green credit

DOI10.1155/2021/5596015MaRDI QIDQ2045330zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kaimin Zheng, Yilin Wei, Qingfeng Zhu

Publication date 12 August 2021

Published in Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1155/2021/5596015

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic ordinary differential equations (aspects of stochastic analysis) (60H10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Review text

Summary: To get rid of the development dilemma of green credit, we constructed a stochastic evolutionary game model of local government, commercial banks, and loan enterprises. We gave sufficient conditions for the stability of strategy based on the stability discriminant theorem of Itô's stochastic differential equation (SDE). Then, we discussed the impacts of incentive and penalty parameters on green credit. Through the above analysis, we got the following conclusions: (1) rewards and punishments always benefit green production and green credit, but increasing incentives is not conducive to the governments' performance of regulatory duties; (2) punishments can better improve the convergence rate of players' strategy than rewards; and (3) both rewards and punishments can exert an obvious effect in improving the changing degree of players' strategy. Finally, we put forward some suggestions to optimize the green credit mechanism.

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