Trust and trustworthiness in corrupted economic environments
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Publication:2052497
DOI10.3390/G12010016zbMATH Open1478.91045OpenAlexW3127076350MaRDI QIDQ2052497FDOQ2052497
Authors: Leonardo Becchetti, Luca Corazzini, Vittorio Pelligra
Publication date: 26 November 2021
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010016
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- Do lies erode trust?
- Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students
- Accountability as a warrant for trust: an experiment on sanctions and justifications in a trust game
- A game theoretical study of generalized trust and reciprocation in Poland. I: Theory and experimental design
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