Trust and trustworthiness in corrupted economic environments

DOI10.3390/G12010016zbMATH Open1478.91045OpenAlexW3127076350MaRDI QIDQ2052497FDOQ2052497

Authors: Leonardo Becchetti, Luca Corazzini, Vittorio Pelligra 

Publication date: 26 November 2021

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g12010016

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zbMATH Keywords

laboratory experimentcorruptionextended trust game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Trust, reciprocity, and social history
• The self-fulfilling property of trust: an experimental study
• Promises and Partnership
• The framing of games and the psychology of play
• Cowards and Heroes: Group Loyalty in the American Civil War
• Does Local Financial Development Matter?

Cited In (10)

• Endogenous institutional selection, building trust, and economic growth
• The role of framing, inequity and history in a corruption game: some experimental evidence
• Honesty in the city
• The COVID-19 pandemic reduces trust behavior
• Trust and Household Debt
• Breaking the rules: anticipation of norm violation in a binary-choice trust game
• Do lies erode trust?
• Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students
• Accountability as a warrant for trust: an experiment on sanctions and justifications in a trust game
• A game theoretical study of generalized trust and reciprocation in Poland. I: Theory and experimental design

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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