Retail channel management decisions under collusion

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2021.01.046zbMath1487.90132OpenAlexW3127585028MaRDI QIDQ2240004

Xin Ma, Jing Lin, Srinivas Talluri, Cheng-Hu Yang

Publication date: 5 November 2021

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2021.01.046

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryretail operationsmulti-channel managementretailers' collusion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06)

Related Items (1)

Managing strategic inventory under retailer competition

Cites Work

• Demand forecast sharing in a dual-channel supply chain
• Introduction of a second channel: Implications for pricing and profits
• Interactions of competing manufacturers' leader-follower relationship and sales format on online platforms
• The shelf space and pricing strategies for a retailer-dominated supply chain with consignment based revenue sharing contracts
• ``Bricks-and-mortar vs. ``clicks-and-mortar: An equilibrium analysis
• Bertrand colludes more than Cournot
• Market Information and Firm Performance
• Managing a Distribution Channel Under Asymmetric Information with Performance Requirements

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