From observable behaviors to structures of interaction in binary games of strategic complements
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Publication:280676
DOI10.3390/E15114648zbMATH Open1422.91607OpenAlexW2042756589MaRDI QIDQ280676FDOQ280676
Publication date: 10 May 2016
Published in: Entropy (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/e15114648
Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Games on graphs (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C57) Games involving graphs (91A43)
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