From observable behaviors to structures of interaction in binary games of strategic complements

DOI10.3390/E15114648MaRDI QIDQ280676zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tomas Rodriguez-Barraquer

Publication date 10 May 2016

Published in Entropy (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/e15114648

zbMATH Keywords

social networkssimple gamesweighted gamespeer effectsstrategic complements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Games on graphs (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C57) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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Cites work

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• Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty
• Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games.
• Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities
• Network games
• On Some Properties of the Hoede-Bakker Index
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• On authority distributions in organizations: Equilibrium.
• On the not-preference-based Hoede-Bakker index
• The set of Nash equilibria of a supermodular game is a complete lattice
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Cited in

(2)

• Strategic default in financial networks
• Strategic complements in two stage, \(2\times 2\) games

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