From observable behaviors to structures of interaction in binary games of strategic complements

DOI10.3390/e15114648zbMath1422.91607OpenAlexW2042756589MaRDI QIDQ280676

Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer

Publication date: 10 May 2016

Published in: Entropy (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/e15114648

zbMATH Keywords

social networkssimple gamesweighted gamespeer effectsstrategic complements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Games involving graphs (91A43) Games on graphs (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C57)

Related Items (1)

Strategic default in financial networks

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