Optimal use of rewards as commitment device when bidding is costly

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2012-0015zbMATH Open1278.91076OpenAlexW2113074874MaRDI QIDQ2867527FDOQ2867527

Authors: Luke Hu 

Publication date: 19 December 2013

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13177/

Recommendations

• Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates
• Commitment in first-price auctions
• Optimal procurement mechanisms: bidding on price and damages for breach
• Cost-Reducing Investment, Optimal Procurement and Implementation by Auctions
• Reserve price commitments in auctions

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designauctionsprocurementindustrial organization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Optimal auctions with simultaneous and costly participation
• Second-price auctions with private entry costs
• Participation in auctions
• Entry and R{\&}D in procurement contracting
• Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates

Cited In (4)

• Optimal cost overruns: procurement auctions with renegotiation
• Commitment in first-price auctions
• Security bid auctions for agency contracts
• Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates

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